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## Does attitude really exist? The anticipation model of implicit attitude

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**Abstract.** This study presents the anticipation model of implicit attitude. According to this model, implicit attitude is a part of the general nonspecific characteristics of an object or situation fixed in an individual's experience. This experience can be applied to new objects or situations without considering their specificity and become a basis for anticipation of their properties. The validity of such an approach is confirmed by psychosemantical study. The proposed model eliminates the issue of attitude being artificial because it emphasises its functional importance in the cognition process and behaviour. Implicit attitude is considered an aspect of experience that serves as a basis for forming preliminary mental representations of objects. This approach allows for the integration of original and modern conceptions of attitude. The results obtained render a generalised interpretation of such well-known psychological phenomena as the halo effect and the spreading attitude effect

**Keywords:** attitude; implicit attitude; anticipation; experience; mental representation

### INTRODUCTION

The concept of attitude has been traditionally considered as one of the most substantial notions in social psychology from the time of G.W. Allport (1935). Therewith, the use of this term is associated with a number of theoretical problems, and one of them is the existence of attitude as a stable construct. Furthermore, an understanding of this term has undergone some changes since G.W. Allport (1935). Today one of the most promising areas of research is the analysis of attitude on the basis of the dual-process theory, which suggests the existence of implicit and explicit cognitive processes. The main purpose of this study is to propose and justify the theoretical model of implicit attitude. It also attempts to show that this model allows solving a number of theoretical issues related to the nature and function of attitude, including the problem of its existence. In addition, the proposed model extends attitude beyond the limits of purely social psychology, considering it one of the basic elements of cognitive processes in general.

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Implicit attitude is usually understood as a latent (at least by origin) and automatically emerging evaluation of certain object as to some extent negative or positive (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald *et al.*, 1998; Stanley *et al.*, 2008; Uleman *et al.*, 2008; Wilson *et al.*, 2000). Firstly, this understanding of implicit attitude directly results from the definition of *attitude*, and secondly, from the modern concept of implicit cognitive processes. Both of these aspects will be considered in the following theoretical analysis.

**The concept of attitude.** Firstly, the question of what is attitude by itself is addressed. The most popular approach to defining it is as follows. Attitude is defined as a favourable or unfavourable disposition toward a certain object, i.e., a subjective evaluation of this object as to some extent negative or positive (Ajzen, 2001; Fazio, 2007; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Heider, 1946; Olson & Fazio, 2001; Osgood *et al.*, 1957; Wilson *et al.*, 2000; Zimbardo &

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Leippe, 1991). In this aspect, objects of a social nature are most often what is meant (sometimes the term *social attitude* is used in this context (Carbon & Hesslinger, 2013)).

Considering the matter in more detail and discussing what this evaluation is and how it is formed, it is still too soon to speak about the unified position accepted in general. Therewith, the models suggest that attitudes based on object-evaluation associations, which are activated spontaneously upon relevant stimulus, are the most acceptable today. A variation of such ideas is the expectancy-value model (Ajzen, 2001; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). According to this model, evaluative meaning (attitude) arises spontaneously and inevitably every time people form an idea regarding an object. In this process, it is presumed that a particular object is associated with certain attributes in an individual's mind. A sum of the subjective evaluations of these attributes, combined with the force of association, delivers this object's final attitude.

The MODE Model (Fazio, 1990; 2007) suggests that attitude is a sum of represented in memory object-evaluation associations, which, if strong enough, could be activated automatically upon the encounter of a relevant object. Whether such an automatically activated attitude further influences an evaluative judgment of this object and behaviour depends on subjective motivation and the capacity to engage in elaborate processing. Similarly, the meta-cognitive model (Petty *et al.*, 2007) assumes that attitude is represented in memory object-evaluation associations that may have varying degrees of confidence and strength. According to this model, if new information about the object is available, new evaluative associations are simply added to the already existing attitude.

Notably, the approach of understanding attitude as a tendency for evaluating an object in a negative or positive way is neither the only approach nor the initial one. In the classic definition by G.W. Allport (1935), included in almost all textbooks on social psychology, "attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience and exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related". This approach connects attitude with subsequent behaviour and considers it as a preliminary stage that directs and preconditions this behaviour.

At its core, this view is very close to the notion of a set, once developed in German psychological science. It implied selective readiness of an individual to react in a certain way to certain stimuli. This notion was introduced into scientific use after Lange showed that the time of the participants' reaction to a certain stimulus can be reduced when their attention is focused on this reaction in advance (Boring, 1961; Briñol & Petty, 2012).

According to both G.W. Allport (1935) and Lange, it is implied that an individual's previous experience determines the character of their perception of objects

and behaviour toward those objects. This is more global property than just object evaluation. Evidently, the evaluation of an object, its subjective attractiveness or unattractiveness influences the nature of an individual's interaction with the object. Nevertheless, an already formed readiness to respond to the object in a certain way suggests a more complex concentration of experience than just a general evaluation of the "like-dislike" type.

Notably, the link between attitude (in the modern meaning) and behaviour is quite ambiguous in general. For example, the famous LaPiere studies have shown that participants who declared a discriminatory position toward certain social groups did not necessarily manifest this position during their interactions with members of these social groups (LaPiere, 1934). The ambiguous relationship between attitudes to certain social groups and behaviour has also been demonstrated in recent studies (Byrka *et al.*, 2019). In other words, attitude showed a rather weak capacity in determining behaviour. This casts doubt on attitude's role as a central category of social psychology (Allport, 1935) and raises the question of whether researchers need to pay as much attention to this subject as it invariably receives.

Moreover, this is one of the reasons to raise the question of whether attitude can be an artificial category. For instance, Schwarz challenges Allport's arguments in their support of the existence of attitude (Schwarz, 2006). As is known, G.W. Allport (1935) proved its existence because he needed to have some construct to explain consistent behaviour. Yet, as noted by Schwarz, what if this is "merely a scientific version of the laypeople's fundamental attribution error..., our well-known tendency to "explain" behaviour by reference to personal dispositions?" (Schwarz, 2006).

Indeed, the question arises whether attitude exists as some mental position, or if it just arises every time a participant needs to evaluate an object proposed by the experimenter as positive or negative. Doubts are reinforced by the results suggesting that people can form new attitudes to explain how they feel on one occasion or another. Based on these results, the supposition was made that attitudes are more current states of activation than ready evaluations accumulated in memory (Wilson *et al.*, 2000).

Another argument in favour of the "absence" of attitude is related to the high-context dependency of its indicators, which was identified in some studies (Ajzen, 2001; Wilson *et al.*, 2000). The point is that people can present different evaluations of the same object depending on the context of the stimulus presentation. Certainly, these data do not indicate the existence of attitude as some sustainable formation.

Regarding the problem of differences between declared attitudes and actual behaviour, a number of interesting theories were proposed to solve it. For example, it has been suggested that attitude is just one of the factors that influence the behaviour. Thus, in the

theory of reasoned action, the authors argue that in explaining behaviour, it is important to consider social norms in addition to attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) assumes that people act according to their intentions and perception of control over their behaviour, but intentions, in turn, are caused by attitudes, subjective norms, and perceptions of behavioural control.

It can be stated that in theories of this kind, the notion of attitude supersedes that in other scientific traditions associated with the notion of motive. Notably, motive is also assigned the functions of general predetermination of behaviour. In fact, attitude serves as a motive transferred in cognition. Consideration of attitude in this context makes it, by definition, a factor of the behaviour because it operates according to truism logic “If I like something, I prefer it” (or similarly, in the case of the motive, “If I want something, I go for it”). It is also obvious that attitude, in this case, will not be a single factor because apart from “like” or “want”, there are subjective possibilities, an understanding of the situation, actualised values, and commitments etc. Therefore, the logic in the construction of these theories is quite natural. Therewith, the function commonality of attitude and motive does not remove the question of whether attitude is an artificial formation. First and foremost, it even reinforces the suspicions because, in this case, it comes down to the categorical augmentation of entities with which Ockham was struggling.

**The concept of implicit attitude.** However, attitude is traditionally associated not with motivation but with the cognitive sphere; thereby, it is related to opinions, beliefs, stereotypes, etc. (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Thurstone, 1928). In this context, attitude is usually understood as some latent basis or hypothetical construct that lies behind expressed opinions or beliefs (Bogardus, 1933; Campbell, 1950; Thurstone, 1928). Attitude is most often associated with prejudices and stereotypes, and, presumably, the most popular field of its study is prejudices to the outgroup (Bogardus, 1933; Byrka *et al.*, 2019; Campbell, 1950; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald *et al.*, 1998; Stanley *et al.*, 2008; Wilson *et al.*, 2000). Thus, attitude is considered as some stable disposition to certain objects, which does not always consider the need for change and the requirements of rationality.

In this connection, it is appropriate to recall another way to solve the problem of the discrepancy between attitude and behaviour. It is assumed that there are two different statuses of attitudes, which the individual may relate to the same object. The first is explicit, obvious, and reflects conscious evaluation; the second is implicit, hidden, and reflects the individual’s “true” position toward an object, which is not always realised. Respectively, a participant can reveal an evaluation of an object that corresponds to an explicit attitude but act on the basis of latent evaluation.

T.D. Wilson *et al.* (2000) suggest that an implicit attitude is activated automatically when an individual encounters an attitude object, while an explicit attitude requires more cognitive capacity and motivation to be retrieved from memory. B. Gawronski & G.V. Bodenhausen (2006) consider that implicit attitudes are based on associative processes and explicit attitudes – on syllogistic propositional inference. In this case, implicit evaluation is automatically and spontaneously generated as soon as the individual is faced with a relevant stimulus. Content obtained from associative stores subsequently undergoes reflection and is transformed into the propositional format and presented in evaluation judgment. This will be the one external evaluation that is presented in explicit attitude.

Attitude separation into implicit and explicit attitudes is, in general, a particular case of similar division of cognitive processes. It is assumed that there are two formats of information processing: the first is based on unconscious, automatic, and fast cognitive processes, and the second – on conscious, voluntary, and slow cognitive processes. The first information-processing mode is also linked with the so-called reflexive system (System 1 or X-system), and the second – with the reflective system (System 2 or C-System) (Evans, 2008; Kounios & Beeman, 2009; Lieberman, 2003; Markovits *et al.*, 2018; Pennycook *et al.*, 2015; Uleman *et al.*, 2008). It is assumed that the first system is based on associative connections, while the second operates with propositional inference. Quick intuitive judgments formed by System 1 are subsequently tested by analytical System 2, which performs reflective functions in relation to these judgments. This way of understanding the operation of cognition is called the theory of dual processes.

Following the logic of this theory, it can be expected that implicit attitude has an unconscious nature. However, not all scientists are ready to agree with this concept. For instance, B. Gawronski & G.V. Bodenhausen (2006) believe that people, at least to some degree, can be aware of implicit attitudes. In this sense, an interesting approach was proposed by A.G. Greenwald & M.R. Banaji (1995), who think that “the signature of implicit cognition is that traces of past experience affect some performance, even though the influential earlier experience is not remembered in the usual sense – that is, it is unavailable to self-report or introspection”. In other words, as applied to attitude, it is not an evaluation itself is unconscious, but a way of its formation – the subjective experience, which causes its occurrence.

Thus, the discrepancy between the declared attitude and actual behaviour can be explained by the assumption of the existence of implicit and explicit attitudes. In addition, the unconscious nature of formation and, possibly, operation of implicit attitudes helps to explain why attitudes are not always compatible with the requirements of rationality. Therewith, this theory

does not eliminate the more global issue of the possible artificiality of this construct.

An explanation of attitudes' functional role in an individual's activity would provide the best proof of their existence as real and acting mental phenomena. In this sense, Allport's understanding of attitude has an advantage because it explains the functional importance of attitude as an accumulator of experience, which provides preparatory tuning of the individual/organism for future stimuli. Further consideration will be given to the ability of attitude to provide a positive or negative evaluation of an object for such a function. Initially, a broader assessment of this evaluation will be explored.

**The psychosemantical approach.** C.E. Osgood *et al.* (1957) investigated the connotative meaning of an object on the basis of evaluations, assigned to this object by participants on a number of scales. In this case, a verbally designated object (concept) was used, along with a number of scales, which had poles which were adjectives with opposite meanings. The participants were asked to evaluate this object with the characteristics provided. After that, the dataset obtained was mathematical processed. Although the adjectives used for subjective scaling were quite diverse, the different scales were highly correlated with each other and eventually reduced to a very small number of independent factors. What is even more interesting is that the obtained factors were almost unchanged for different objects. That is, most commonly, the same set of independent factors ("Evaluation", "Potency", "Activity") were allocated in the process of each object's evaluation with various scales.

Certainly, when using the specific characteristics for objects from different thematic areas, the obtained factor structure may be more complicated: additional factors may occur (when the original set of characteristics includes some specific features of a thematic area), and the "Power" or "Activity" factors may not occur or may merge into one factor. Meanwhile, the "Evaluation" factor is constant for a wide variety of objects. This factor just implies the generally positive or negative participants' position on an object, that is, attitude, which was discussed above (in the same way it was interpreted by C.E. Osgood *et al.*, 1957).

Such constancy of the "Evaluation" factor in characterising different objects indirectly suggests that attitudes are the constant companions of objects' concepts. This is also indicated by the invariance of factors selected by C.E. Osgood *et al.* (1957) regarding the various

thematic areas. Indeed, the fact that the same factors are allocated while characterising the different objects indicates that the selection of these factors is independent of the objects. This is a ready-made set of parameters that apply to different things. Thus, these factors (in particular, "Evaluation") are important for us a priori; therefore, attitude is hardly an artificial formation.

Moreover, this apriority of these factors, i.e., independence from an object's specifics, means that in some level of cognition, this specificity is not important for us at all; it is important to know only whether an object is good or bad, big or small, changeable or permanent. By the way, these factors usually explain most of the data dispersion in the scale evaluation. The "Evaluation" factor (attitude) pertains to this level of cognition as its component. Therewith, it remains possible that the existence of these factors is conditioned by the very scale evaluation procedure, i.e. is an artefact. It is necessary to turn to the data of empirical examination to clarify that.

## MATERIALS AND METHODS

Initially, this study was formally directed not to analyse attitudes but to explore a phenomenon that manifests itself in certain features of advertising impact (Zhovtianska, 2004). Therewith, advertising impact is a good illustrator of the processes of the formation of attitudes, and often also the implicit processes. In this case, the influence on recipients of visual image-based advertising that does not contain any concrete information about the product therein represented. These "informationless" pictures and plots are often seen on TV or in magazines. The study intended to identify whether a viewer can form mental representations of advertised products (i.e. ideas about this product) under such circumstances and, if the answer is positive, what the grounds for it should be. As presented further, such mental representations were formed despite the lack of information, and attitudes have a direct bearing on this process.

**Method.** There were 99 participants (54 male and 45 female), National Technical University of Ukraine "Kyiv Polytechnic Institute" undergraduates. People who had experience with the products presented in the advertisement or who had any knowledge of them were eliminated from participating because the formation of ideas about the product only on the basis of advertising was desired. Thus, a different number of participants for the different advertised products was used (from 79 to 98). The exact number of participants for each product is shown in the table of results (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Pearson correlations between common factors for products and advertisements. Coefficients in bold are substantial,  $p < 0.01$

Product	Factor name	r	N
Perfume 1	Evaluation	0.78	95
	Activity	0.30	
Perfume 2	Evaluation	0.63	95

Table 1, Continued

Product	Factor name	r	N
Cologne 1	Evaluation	0.48	98
	Non-triviality	0.46	
Cologne 2	Evaluation	0.63	98
	Mysteriousness	0.42	
Cigarettes 1	Evaluation	0.62	79
	Potency	0.45	
	Style	0.45	
	Elegance	0.42	
Cigarettes 2	Evaluation	0.50	79
	Business-like air	0.44	
	Style	0.05	
Liquor 1	Evaluation	0.71	82
	Antiquity	0.12	
Liquor 2	Evaluation	0.78	82
	Coolness	0.49	

Source: compiled by the author of this study

**Materials and procedure.** For the experiment, eight examples of print advertisements were selected, each containing only an artistic image that was unrelated to the product advertised or the product's trademark. The participants who were given these materials answered the following questions: first, whether the pictures presented to them contained any information about the products advertised, and second, whether the pictures provided any objective reasons for them to make conclusions about these products. Almost unanimous denial in the first and second cases were received. It was confirmation of the fact that the advertisement did not contain any real information about the product. In addition, the "informationless" nature of our advertising was provided by its specificity. The advertised goods were perfumes, colognes, cigarettes, and liquors. A visual image without semantic information cannot directly transmit taste or odour, which is essential for these types of products.

The participants were then asked to write out characteristics for each of the products and then to assign these characteristics to each of the advertising pictures. After that, the subjective scaling procedure used the most frequently used characteristics for the goods and the advertisements. It was built on the 18 scales (from -3 to 3) for each product and for each advertisement. Participants initially evaluated the products and then evaluated the advertising pictures. The data identified in the subjective scaling procedure was processed by the method of principal components. As a result, eight sets of factors for the advertisements, and, respectively, eight sets of factors for the commercial products presented in these advertisements were received.

## RESULTS

It was interesting to see that the average number of characteristics that the participants attributed to the goods was even higher than the number of characteristics

they gave to the advertisements. That is, the fact that advertising does not provide information to form an idea of the product (as was noticed by the participants) has not prevented them from forming these ideas – at least at the level of preliminary guesses. People easily described the products using a variety of characteristics. Now, there is a question: what is the basis for forming the characteristics of the products if there are no objective reasons available for doing that? The results of the psychosemantic analysis cleared up the mystery.

As usually happens in such situations, the sets of factors that are received included both traditional, universal factors ("Evaluation", "Potency", "Activity") and non-universal, more or less non-specific factors (e.g., "Non-triviality", "Mysteriousness", etc.). The traditional factors were more loaded than the non-universal factors. Notably, the contents of the not universal factors for the products and the corresponding advertisements often coincided. Thus, many common factors were present in the evaluation of the products and the corresponding advertisements. The analysis shows that in most of the cases there were substantial correlations among these common factors (Table 1).

The results show that the more loaded (and, respectively, more non-specific) the factors, the closer the correlation was. In particular, the "Evaluation" factors have the highest factor loadings and the highest correlation coefficients. The "Potency" and "Activity" factors were not always present, but when present they always correlated. The common, more or less non-specific factors were correlated in most cases but weaker than the universal factors. Notably, more factors were connected by closer correlations than the separate common characteristics that make up these factors.

This allowed concluding that evaluations by non-specific factors are transferred from the advertisement to the product. For example, if the advertisement was perceived in a positive light by the recipient, i.e.,

is evaluated positively by the “Evaluation” factor, then most likely, the product will also be perceived positively and, accordingly, will be evaluated positively by the “Evaluation” factor. Furthermore, these transferred evaluations become the basis for the formation of preliminary ideas about this product; they unfolded in the concept of this product through the characteristics inherent to its specificity. For example, if an advertisement for perfumes was perceived by the recipient in a positive light by the “evaluation” factor, it would be reflected in the product description through such characteristics as “Aromatic”, “Exquisite”, “Expensive”, etc. That is, the transfer does not involve primary characteristics by themselves but the deeper, more or less non-specific parameters (factors) that manifest themselves through these characteristics. This follows not only from the fact that the correlation of factor was closer than the correlation of separate characteristics. The point is that the descriptions of the products had many characteristics that were not in the descriptions of respective advertisements, and they could not be transferred directly.

## DISCUSSION

**General interpretation of results.** The results show that the advertising impact is conducted through non-specific (or more or less non-specific) factors, and the less specific the factor, the better the effect. In other words, the general impression from the advertisement is transmitted to the advertised product. This impression is represented by general factors of the object’s evaluation. On the basis of this impression, the participants formed anticipations of a product’s properties. Accordingly, the experience gained in one situation (perception of the picture) is used as some kind of prediction of stimuli properties that have not been presented in the experience before. Notably, this experience has mostly non-specific content, which allows it to be applied to objects of another nature. Being obtained as the impression from the advertising, it is transferred to a qualitatively different object – the advertised product.

The fact that objects of a different nature can be likened or vice versa differentiated in space of non-specific factors was already noted by C.E. Osgood (1953). In fact, the ability to locate and compare different objects in the same space gave their method the name of semantic differential. Osgood also stated that this ability is close to the metaphor in nature (Osgood, 1952).

The commonness of impressions from advertising and advertised products is close in substance to the metaphorical likening. Objects of an entirely different nature are also likened in the metaphor on the basis of our subjective impressions. Approximately the same thing is happening in this case: the products and advertisements were combined in the space of underlying factors, which reflect more general impressions than specific data.

Notably, the factor-based evaluations transfer from advertising to the product allows recipients not merely

to “restore” the more specific characteristics of the product, i.e. imagine it. The participants of this study were not given the task to train the imagination. They wrote out the characteristics that, in their opinion, should be inherent to the product. Therefore, it is not poetical but rather very pragmatic capacities of such metaphoric transfer that are used in advertising. Participants form anticipations about the potential characteristics of the product, although they understand that there are no objective reasons for these judgments. This kind of advertising forms a certain non-specific experience in its recipient and hopes, not without good reason, that this experience will be used in the future.

As seen, an important part of this experience is the evaluation component, which reflects the subjective attractiveness of an object (“Evaluation” factor), that is attitude in its modern interpretation. Therewith, the nature of this attitude functioning and other non-specific factors more closely resemble what has been called attitude by G.W. Allport (1935). In fact, Allport’s approach implies that the experience previously gained by the individual forms a state of preliminary readiness with regard to certain stimuli. In this case, this readiness manifested in anticipation of certain properties of advertised objects, and the state of readiness is based on a non-specific experience obtained based on the perception of advertising. Generally, the study has reached the intersection of the contemporary and original understanding of attitude as presented by G.W. Allport (1935).

Thus, it can be stated that attitude performs a real function in behaviour. It could be an element of non-specific experience, allowing the formation of a preliminary mental representation of the object (ideas about the object). It plays the role of anticipation with regard to future situations, things, and phenomena of reality. From this, it follows that attitude is not an artefact but a real and valid mental phenomenon.

Therewith, a more complicated state of readiness for a new stimulus than just simple evaluation of the stimulus is evident. The results presented indicate that it is expedient to extend the views on attitude, and it should be seen within the context of the functioning of a broader system more or less to non-specific parameters, among which subjective evaluation of an object as positive or negative is only an element, though an important one.

In addition, there is one more important point. The context of this empirical study does not involve just attitude, but implicit attitude. Externally it is manifested through certain judgments – the characteristics that should be inherent to the advertised object as seen from the viewpoint of the participants. Therewith, for these people, these characteristics are, in a certain meaning of the word, groundless: at least, they do not see any objective reasons or have any available information suitable to make these judgments. By their origins, these judgments are of an automatic and spontaneous nature rather than a voluntary and deliberate

nature. That is, the implicit are not the ideas about the object (their existence is clearly expressed in the participants, at least at the level of expecting the object to have certain properties) but the grounds for such ideas to emerge. It is the use of experience that has the implicit nature in this case.

The important thing here is not even the reports of the participants. The point is that the experience obtained by the participants during their interaction with an object of a certain nature (advertising picture) is translated to an object of a completely different nature (the product advertised). From an objective viewpoint, this is an absolutely inadequate transfer. The advertisement and the product are combined only formally, and the impression from the artistic image has no relation to the product that was just named in the picture. In this case, the transfer of the evaluations by non-specific factors did not correlate in any way to the explicit reason.

**The relationship of the results to other models and concepts.** Operating on the characteristics of an object without reference to objective analysis is very close to the theories of dual processes associated with System 1. Indeed, these non-specific characteristics serve as a heuristic and form a fast preliminary conclusion about an object, as they do in System 1. Furthermore, this is one aspect of our experience, which, as demonstrated, is used without any rational analysis. It provides a spontaneous impression of the object, rather than an analytical knowledge of it. Therewith, the evaluation component by itself is an important aspect of this impression. Thus, the attitude is woven into the work of implicit processes, and it will be present in people's cognitions before the reflexive system intervenes.

The above empirical data suggests that there is a level of functioning of cognition where an object is represented in its non-specific characteristics. Then, it can be assumed that it is just that material that is operated by implicit cognitive processes (System 1). The activity of System 1 is something more complicated than just associative processes. Although the basis of the associations' forming may be the common non-specific characteristics between a stimulus and a response. In any case, this allows a fresh look at System 1, still known very little about.

While the results of this study completely align with the theory of dual processes, they come into partial contradiction with the expectancy-value model of attitude. To be more exact, the part of it where attitude is viewed as a summary of subjective values of an object's attributes, as assigned to it by an individual, including the strength of the corresponding associations (Fishbein & Aisen, 1975). The point is that according to this model, attitude is secondary to an individual's analysis of the various characteristics of an object in terms of their positive or negative evaluation. In this case, though, it appears that attitude is, on the contrary,

a basis to form the characteristics of a product, which are then assigned to this product by the individuals.

At first sight, the expectancy-value model seems to be more logical and even trivial. Indeed, if an object has positive characteristics from the viewpoint of the individual, it will be evaluated in a positive way; if it has negative characteristics, it will be evaluated in a negative way, respectively. Therewith, the data shows that an object may be evaluated in this way or another even without the individual understanding what characteristics this object actually has.

Generally speaking, the question of priority of an object's characteristics and an object's attitude is relative similar to the question of the chicken and the egg. For example, this experiment showed that the characteristics of a product are built on the basis of an already existing attitude, while the attitude itself was formed as an experience of the individual's interaction with advertising and was therefore secondary to the characteristics of this advertising. In fact, it appears that the mental representation of a new object is never formed out of nothing but always makes use of developments based on a previous experience. In this study, it is attempted to prove that attitude can act as just such a development.

Studies confirming the active use of previous experience as previewing hypotheses for further cognitive activity and behaviour of the organism (or individual) have long been classics. The perception of stimuli by building and verifying such latent experience-based hypotheses has already been laid on the psycho-physiological substrate (Greve, 2015). In the psychological realm, it was identified both for relatively simple cognitions on the level of perception (Bruner, 1973; Neisser, 1976; Seth, 2013; Sherif & Cantril, 1945), more complicated mental processes (Baus *et al.*, 2014), and also social behaviour (Guerin, 1991).

The obtained empirical data show that when forming ideas about an object, the role of such hypotheses or anticipations is played by the general non-specific characteristics of the object, in particular, its evaluation, i.e. attitude. It was also observed that this is an implicit attitude. In fact, it is quite logical that implicit cognitive processes fulfil the role of anticipations. These are fast processes that provide a result before a complete and broad analysis of the situation is ready. Therefore, it is logical that the evaluation and preliminary impression of an object may be formed before the individual has a clear understanding of its various characteristics and evaluates them. An especially substantial role in this belongs to the attitude. For an organism, during its interaction with the environment, it can be very important to get a quick evaluation of the situation. For example, if it is dangerous, then it will not have the time and opportunities for a more detailed analysis.

**The anticipation model of implicit attitude and its explanatory potential.** In light of the foregoing, the presented considerations about the nature of implicit

attitude may be called the anticipative model. This model suggests that implicit attitude is a part of the general nonspecific characteristics of an object or a situation fixed in an individual's experience. This experience can be transferred to another object or situation, with no regard to their specificity, and become a basis for anticipation of their properties. This model emphasises the functional importance of attitude, which is considered neither as a secondary (side) aspect of cognition nor as a substitute for a motive, but as a basis for the formation of ideas about reality. In particular, this allows the removal of the issue of artificial introduction of this category. In short, the model suggests considering implicit attitude as a substantive element of experience, which is used to anticipate the properties of unknown objects without rational justification. The above-mentioned results provide the opportunity to explain a number of well-known psychological phenomena.

Firstly, it is the well-known halo effect discovered by E.L. Thorndike (1920), later proven in multiple studies. Thorndike showed that if a person is characterised positively by others for some single feature, this person is more likely to be characterised positively for other features, even with the absence of objective evidence for that. That is, it involves the generalisation of characteristics assigned to a certain personality. Furthermore, social psychology is engaged in the active study of examples in the "transfer" of features from one personality to another personality that is associated with it (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Uleman *et al.*, 2008). It is believed that in such cases, associations of the "person-feature" type formed in regard to one object are then just reproduced in the description of the other object (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005).

The results obtained in research of non-information advertising allow claiming that the transfer from one person to another does not involve features themselves but more general connotative factors that manifest themselves further through certain characteristics adequate for these objects in the course of an object's description. The same thing happens in a case with the halo effect: positive characteristics of a person by one feature are an indicator of corresponding exponents by the more general evaluative factor, which shows a tendency for manifestation through other positive characteristics. Thus, the implicit attitude manifestations are presented in the anticipation model. These manifestations relate to the transfer of implicit attitude to another object and the ability of implicit attitude to be an anticipation of the properties of this new object.

Another phenomenon, inherently similar to the phenomenon of impression-transfer in advertising influence, is known as the "spreading attitude effect" (Uleman *et al.*, 2008) or as "evaluative conditioning" (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Jones *et al.*, 2010). This concept suggests that if some neutral stimulus is constantly coupled with a subjectively not indifferent

stimulus (positive or negative), then this once neutral stimulus begins to be perceived in a positive or negative way (depending on how the not indifferent stimulus was evaluated). That is, the evaluation impression seems to flow from one object to the other that is connected associatively with it.

Something similar can be observed in the influence of non-informational advertising: the impression provoked by the advertising is associatively transferred to the name of the product mentioned there. Therewith, the situation is more complicated in this case: in the first place, the impression extends not on the name by itself but on the contents, i.e. on the product; in the second place, this impression appears to be something more complicated than a merely positive or negative evaluation. That is, classical evaluative conditioning is a separate and simple case of the more general process of a transfer of a non-specific experience recorded in this experiment by the example of the advertising influence.

Further, the results obtained on the basis of this experiment allow considering not only the social-psychological mechanisms but also the general-psychological mechanisms that are connected to the universal process of cognition – this can be claimed preliminarily. It is the implicit formation of mental representation of an object based on the existing individual experience associated with this object, involving, in particular, the use of an implicit attitude.

## CONCLUSIONS

Experimental data allows the consideration of implicit attitude as an aspect of experience that provides the anticipation of new stimuli properties. It can serve as a basis for forming preliminary mental representations of objects (ideas about objects) and thus is an element of a predictive system. This understanding emphasises the functional importance of attitude in the process of cognition and adaptive behaviour and allows the resolution of the issue of its artificial nature. This standpoint brings us back to the starting point once set by Allport. However, returning to this starting point happens at a new level, at a new turn of the spiral, with the involvement of knowledge about the implicit attitude. In this study, implicit attitude based on the specifics of the task set before the participants was examined. The direction for further research could be to verify the relevance of the proposed model using special methods for investigating implicit processes. Another promising area for research may be the role of attitudes in the formation of implicit cognitions represented by System 1.

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## CONFLICT OF INTEREST

None.

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## Чи існує таке ставлення насправді? Модель антиципації імпліцитного ставлення

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**Анотація.** У даній статті представлена модель антиципації імпліцитного ставлення. Згідно з цією моделлю, неявне ставлення є частиною загальних неспецифічних характеристик об'єкта або ситуації, закріплених у досвіді особистості. Цей досвід може застосовуватися до нових об'єктів або ситуацій, не враховуючи їх специфічність, і стати основою для антиципації їх властивостей. Обґрунтованість такого підходу підтверджена психосемантичним дослідженням. Запропонована модель дозволяє уникнути питання штучності ставлення, оскільки вона підкреслює його функціональне значення у процесі сприйняття та поведінки. Неявне ставлення розглядається як аспект досвіду, що служить основою для формування попередніх ментальних уявлень про об'єкти. Цей підхід дозволяє інтегрувати оригінальні та сучасні концепції світовідчуття. Отримані результати дають узагальнену інтерпретацію таких відомих психологічних феноменів, як ефект ореолу та ефект поширення ставлення.

**Ключові слова:** ставлення; імпліцитне ставлення; антиципація; досвід; ментальна репрезентація